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BOOK REVIEW 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND CONTINGENCY 
PECULIAR  INSTITUTION:  AMERICA’S  DEATH  PENALTY  IN  AN 
AGE  OF  ABOLITION.  By David Garland.  Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  2010.  Pp. 393.  $35.00. 
Reviewed by Carol S. Steiker
∗ 
In the past decade, a burgeoning literature has sought to address 
the growing divide between the United States and other Western liber-
al democracies with regard to criminal punishment practices.  Al-
though all of these countries, the United States included, have expe-
rienced many of the same problems over the past forty years — such 
as steep crime rate increases, a sophisticated international drug trade, 
and growing threats from terrorism — the United States has seen 
nothing short of a revolution in its punishment practices since the 
1960s, a stunning shift unprecedented in its own history and unique 
among its contemporaries.  American imprisonment rates have soared, 
increasing fivefold between 1972 and 2007,1 reflecting and accompany-
ing other punitive criminal justice policies such as “zero tolerance” po-
licing initiatives, expansions of the scope of the substantive criminal 
law, “three strikes” statutes enhancing punishment for recidivists, in-
creased use of criminal sanctions for juvenile offenders, widespread 
authorization of sentences of life without possibility of parole — and, 
of course, increased use of the death penalty.2 
A diverse group of scholars, including historians, sociologists, and 
legal scholars, has offered various explanations for these radical 
changes — some complementary, some contradictory.  Professor David 
Garland was an early and influential participant in this scholarly dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗  Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  For helpful and engaging discus-
sions, I thank the participants in the Radcliffe exploratory seminar Comparative Perspectives on 
the Death Penalty, held at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University on 
May 20–21, 2011, and especially my seminar cohost, Moshik Temkin of the Harvard Kennedy 
School. 
  1  Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century 
Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects,  100 J.  CRIM.  L.  &  CRIMINOLOGY  1225,  1228 
(2010). 
  2  See David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally, 33 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 295, 331 (2008) (finding that “a country’s death penalty status is linked to its 
general punitiveness toward criminals”).  See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
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cussion with his generative book The Culture of Control,3 in which he 
described the recent trends in crime policy and social attitudes toward 
crime in both the United States and Britain as the product of “two un-
derlying social forces — the distinctive social organization of late mod-
ernity, and the free market, socially conservative politics that came to 
dominate the USA and the UK in the 1980s.”4  Now Garland has 
turned his attention to a crime policy issue that divides the United 
States from Britain and the rest of the Western industrialized world — 
the continued retention and use of capital punishment, which accele-
rated in the United States from the 1970s to the 1990s, the same period 
in which Europe embraced abolition. 
In Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Ab-
olition, Garland addresses three ways in which the American death 
penalty is “peculiar.”  First, he tackles directly the question of peculiar-
ity in the sense of distinctiveness, seeking to understand why many ju-
risdictions within the United States “continue to use capital punish-
ment at a time when all other Western nations have decisively 
abandoned it” (p. 11).  Second, Garland seeks to understand the pecu-
liarity of the manner in which the death penalty is maintained in many 
American jurisdictions, which reflects “an extreme form of institutional 
ambivalence, expressed in a uniquely cumbersome and conflicted set of 
arrangements” (p. 11), making the punishment “poorly adapted to the 
stated purposes of criminal justice” (p. 13).  Finally, Garland connects 
the peculiarity of the American death penalty to the original American 
“peculiar institution” — slavery — and argues that there are “undenia-
ble” (p. 13) though difficult to specify (p. 12) continuities between 
America’s history of racial violence, especially lynching, and its con-
temporary capital punishment practices.  Garland’s account both bor-
rows and distinguishes itself from other accounts of “American excep-
tionalism” with regard to capital and criminal punishment practices, 
ultimately crafting an insightful portrait of contemporary American 
culture and law by tracing the contours of a single institution. 
Much is at stake in Garland’s account and its relationship to those 
of other scholars — more, at least, than the usual struggle for preemi-
nence in the ivory tower.  In a section called “Against Conventional 
Wisdom” (p. 17), Garland takes a stand in opposition to those who use 
simplistic dichotomies to explain America’s divergence from its peers 
with regard to capital punishment: “‘Americans’ are punitive and ‘Eu-
ropeans’ are not.  Americans are Puritan, or vigilante, or racist, or in-
dividualistic, and Europeans are not” (p. 20).  In contrast, Garland 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  3  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CON-
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  4  Id. at x.    
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emphasizes the commonalities in the long sweep of the history of capi-
tal punishment in the United States and Europe: American states were 
at the forefront of the abolition movement that began in earnest in the 
mid-nineteenth century, following a period on both sides of the Atlan-
tic of contraction of the scope of capital punishment and the substitu-
tion of other modes of punishment, especially imprisonment.  The 
United States diverged from Europe only recently, in the period since 
1970, and Garland seeks the explanation for this late-stage slowing or 
stalling of the movement toward abolition in particular events and 
prevailing conditions of the past forty years.  The clash between Gar-
land’s more contingent account of America’s divergence and other 
more essentialist accounts is a battle with important ramifications both 
for future policy possibilities and for intellectual discourse. 
On the policy side, Garland’s persuasive emphasis on contingency 
with regard to America’s recent divergence on capital punishment un-
dermines the view, apparent in the media on both sides of the conflict 
over abolition, that the American death penalty is the product of some 
deep cultural divide between the United States and its contemporaries.  
At stake here is the malleability of the future of the American death 
penalty.  If long-standing, powerful cultural forces are at play — akin 
to those posited by Michael Moore in his extreme but influential film 
Bowling for Columbine,5 which portrayed a distinctive American cul-
ture of fear and violence — then America’s death penalty and, by ex-
tension, the rest of its punitive criminal justice policies are the inevita-
ble reflections of American character.  To change such policies would 
thus require taking aim at deep features of that character.  Conversely, 
if America’s current death penalty practices are not the product of in-
exorable historical or cultural forces but rather the contingent and pos-
sibly ephemeral expression of history and culture as mediated by rela-
tively recent events, then perhaps the same is true for America’s other 
punitive criminal justice policies, given that they are the products of 
the same several decades.  In this way, Garland’s Peculiar Institution 
thesis reins in to some extent his own more sweeping analysis in The 
Culture of Control, which emphasized the central role of conditions of 
“late modernity” in explaining crime policy in the United States and 
Britain.  The Culture of Control evoked concerns from critics that Gar-
land was generalizing too much from the experiences of the United 
States and Britain and forecasting an inevitable and universal dysto-
pian future.6  Peculiar Institution, in contrast, balances the sweep of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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its sociological history of American political and social structures with 
recurring focus on the events of the recent past. 
Shifts in the relative explanatory powers of broad-brush sociologi-
cal theories vis-à-vis recent, contingent events have consequences not 
just for the future malleability of criminal justice policies but also for 
the intellectual project of what Garland calls “sociological history” (p. 
15).  What does it mean to offer a “history of the present,” in Fou-
cault’s terminology (p. 16)?  How can we speak meaningfully about 
“causes” and “effects” of profoundly complex, often ambiguous, and 
ever-evolving social practices and discourses like those of criminal and 
capital punishment?  How can the sociological historian offer an ac-
count that is comprehensive enough to have explanatory or predictive 
value without reifying the present and treating whatever is as what 
must be?  Garland’s skepticism of overly deterministic accounts of the 
American death penalty offers an important window onto this tension 
and sounds a cautionary note for both producers and consumers of so-
ciological history. 
In what follows, I first situate Garland in the larger conversation 
about American penal exceptionalism and then underscore and extend 
his contribution regarding capital punishment and contingency.  Part I 
surveys a variety of contrasting accounts of the divergence of Ameri-
ca’s criminal and capital punishment policies from those of its peers 
and assesses Garland’s contributions to this broad conversation.  Part 
II seeks to illustrate and deepen Garland’s account of the contingency 
of America’s recent death penalty story.  This latter Part emphasizes 
the role of the Supreme Court in that story and argues that current 
American death penalty practices are even more deeply contingent 
than Garland recognizes: not only the fact of American retention but 
also the peculiarity of its form might have unfolded very differently.  I 
develop this argument by imagining three counterfactual — and ex-
tremely divergent — American death penalty stories-that-might-have-
been. 
I.  THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT:  
GARLAND IN CONTEXT 
The literature on American penal exceptionalism is broad and mul-
tidisciplinary — far too extensive and wide ranging to explore com-
prehensively here.  Nonetheless, a brief survey of the different em-
phases offered by contrasting accounts is helpful in highlighting the 
nature and power of Garland’s intervention.  This Part ultimately con-
cludes that Garland’s most significant contribution is his recognition of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Penal Theory, 22 O.J.L.S. 341, 353 (2002) (questioning “whether the Anglo-American response to 
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both the importance and the contingency of the events of the last few 
decades of the twentieth century in the story of America’s divergence 
from its peers on the issue of capital punishment, though he overstates 
the distinctiveness of his approach from those of some others.  
A.  Contrasting Accounts of American Penal Exceptionalism 
Although there are many more that could plausibly be included, 
the following five works illustrate the wide range of explanatory ac-
counts that have characterized the debate about the divergence of the 
United States in criminal and capital justice policies.  As in the parable 
of the blind men describing an elephant based on their examination of 
a single part (the trunk, the ear, the tail, and so forth), each scholar 
sees a different creature depending on the nature of the chosen focal 
point. 
1.  James Whitman. — In Harsh Justice,7 Professor James Whit-
man offers a primarily historical and cultural account of the diver-
gence of American punishment practices that reaches back to the mid-
eighteenth century.  In the early modern era in Europe, Whitman ar-
gues, high-status and low-status offenders were treated differentially 
with regard to punishment, with milder and more dignified punish-
ments (such as relatively privileged confinement and beheading) re-
served for aristocrats and the like, and harsher and more degrading 
punishments (such as forced labor, mutilation, and hanging) inflicted 
on the common rabble.8  In the modern era of liberalization and de-
mocratization, continental European countries such as France and 
Germany extended the use of dignified punishments to all, “leveling 
up” the nature and norms of acceptable punishment practices.9  I n  
contrast, in the United States, egalitarianism involved eliminating all 
forms of high-status treatment and thus resulted in a “leveling down” 
of the nature and norms of punishment practices, leading to a genera-
lized use of harsh sanctions and an embrace of degradation as an ac-
ceptable or even essential element of punishment.10  Whitman thus 
traces the current divide in punishment practices — from incarceration 
rates, to the treatment of juveniles, to the scope of criminalization, to 
the conditions of confinement in jails and prisons11 — to differential 
norms of status equality. 
The bulk of Whitman’s exposition is devoted to developing his 
“dignity versus degradation” thesis, but he supplements this account 
with an argument about the power of the state in Europe as compared 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  7  WHITMAN, supra note 2. 
  8  See id. at 9. 
  9  See id. at 10. 
  10  See id. at 42–43. 
  11  See id. at 3.    
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with that in the United States: “Traditions of social hierarchy are thus 
a large part of what makes France and Germany different, in their 
punishment practices, from the United States.  The power and auton-
omy of the French and German states are another part.”12  By “power 
and autonomy,” Whitman means to describe the ways in which Conti-
nental polities are characterized both by greater deference to state so-
vereignty and by greater insulation of state apparatuses and bureau-
cracies from democratic pressures.  The United States, by contrast, is 
less autonomous and thus “is more given over to democratic politics — 
which is often to say demagogic politics.”13  It also provokes more anti-
statist suspicion when it regulates forbidden conduct.  Thus, Whitman 
concludes: “A relatively weak state, like the American one, is much 
more prey to a harsh retributive politics than these [French and Ger-
man] continental states are, and less able to forbid acts without brand-
ing them as evil.”14 
2.  Franklin Zimring. — In The Contradictions of American Capital 
Punishment,15 Professor Franklin Zimring confines his analysis to the 
divergence between Europe and the United States on the use of capital 
punishment in particular, rather than on harshness in criminal pu-
nishment more generally as Whitman does.  But like Whitman, Zim-
ring is convinced that the answer to America’s recent divergence is 
rooted in the past — in particular, in the distinctive culture of vigilante 
justice that prevailed in some parts of the United States more than a 
century ago.  Looking specifically at execution rates (rather than for-
mal retention of the death penalty or even death sentencing rates), 
Zimring demonstrates “the close link between a history of vigilante 
conduct early in the twentieth century and the propensity to conduct 
executions in the 1980s and 1990s.”16  Using lynching as the most “ex-
treme example of vigilante values,” Zimring observes the connection 
between “excessive communal force at the dawn of the twentieth cen-
tury and the propensity to execution a century later.”17 
Zimring explains this connection by noting “[t]he radical degovern-
mentalization of the death penalty”18 in the United States — the “sym-
bolic transformation”19 of capital punishment from a sovereign act to 
one done to vindicate the suffering of victims and reaffirm their social 
status.  “We now tell ourselves that an executing government is acting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  12  Id. at 199. 
  13  Id. 
  14  Id. at 201. 
  15  FRANKLIN  E.  ZIMRING,  THE  CONTRADICTIONS  OF  AMERICAN  CAPITAL  PUNISH-
MENT (2003). 
  16  Id. at 66. 
  17  Id. 
  18  Id. at 52. 
  19  Id. at 55.    
766  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 125:760 
in the interest of victims and communities rather than in a display of 
governmental power and dominance.”20  Thus, contemporary execu-
tions, in their symbolic harkening to private violence, echo the enact-
ment of vigilante violence in earlier eras — at least in American com-
munities with deeply ingrained histories of such practices.  In contrast 
to this American reinvention of the meaning of capital punishment, 
Zimring describes the European contemporary turn toward seeing cap-
ital punishment as an issue about the proper limits of state power and 
international human rights.21  In Zimring’s view, the deep divergence 
between these two diametrically opposed discourses explains the di-
vide in practices across the Atlantic. 
Zimring also uses the link to vigilante values to explain patterns of 
executions within the United States.  In the same decades in which the 
United States and Europe diverged on the death penalty, executions 
became more geographically concentrated within the United States, 
with a larger percentage of executions taking place in a smaller num-
ber of states — and with those states concentrated in the southern and 
southwestern United States.22  Thus, Zimring concludes, earlier pat-
terns of vigilante violence explain not only America’s divergence from 
Europe but also much of the divergence among jurisdictions within 
the United States: “[T]he particular origins of the very different execu-
tion policies among American states are not to be found in current 
events or recent history, but rather in differences between states that 
are at least half a century old.”23 
Finally, as Zimring’s book title suggests, he emphasizes the “contra-
dictions” between the continued embrace of executions within the United 
States and the traditional American fear of government and respect for 
due process.  These contradictions, in Zimring’s view, explain why execu-
tions in the United States “generate ambivalence and conflict”24 — with 
the consequence that “the debate about executions will remain more im-
portant in America than it was or will be in other nations.”25 
3.  Michael Tonry. — In  Explanations of American Punishment 
Policies,26 Professor Michael Tonry joins both Whitman and Zimring 
in looking to the past to explain America’s recent divergence from Eu-
rope in punishment practices.  Tonry begins by citing his own earlier 
work, which found that “[m]oderate penal policies and low imprison-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  20  Id. at ix. 
  21  See id. at 40. 
  22  See id. at 77. 
  23  Id. at 85. 
  24  Id. at x. 
  25  Id. at 126. 
  26  Michael Tonry, Explanations of American Punishment Policies: A National History,  11 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 377 (2009).    
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ment rates are associated with low levels of income inequality, high le-
vels of trust and legitimacy, strong welfare states, professionalized as 
opposed to politicized criminal justice systems and consensual rather 
than conflictual political cultures.”27  Tonry then seeks to understand 
why the United States falls at the “wrong end” of each of these me-
trics.28  He theorizes that the answer lies in American “cultural and po-
litical values” — in particular, in four factors that Tonry calls “the pa-
ranoid strain, Protestant fundamentalism, governmental structure and 
patterns of racial hierarchy.”29 
By “paranoid strain,” Tonry means to describe a style of American 
politics in which “[w]hat is deeply disapproved is seen as evil or im-
moral and few means are off limits in pursuit of its eradication.”30  To-
nry connects “Protestant fundamentalism” to intolerance and xenopho-
bia and gives historical examples of Protestant fundamentalist support 
for the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, McCarthyism, and moralistic 
crusades against drugs and crime.31  The “governmental structures” 
Tonry sees as most implicated in crime policy are the federalism com-
manded by the Constitution, the widespread state practices of electing 
prosecutors and judges, and winner-take-all electoral systems, which 
result in the “[p]oliticization of criminal justice policy.”32  Finally, Ton-
ry notes the persistent racially disparate impact of criminal justice pol-
icies in the United States;33 he concludes that a long-standing pattern 
of racial insensitivity has rendered the human costs of America’s extraor-
dinarily severe crime control policies “both tolerable and ignorable.”34 
Not content with his own quartet of theories, Tonry urges himself 
and others to dig deeper: “Why have the paranoid strain and moralistic 
Protestant intolerance recurred . . . and why has the influence of tor-
tured race relations remained so powerful?”35  To Tonry, the answers 
likely lie even further back in history: “Big ideas about American his-
tory, including the Puritanism and intolerance of the first settlers, 
ideals of individualism and libertarianism associated with the frontier 
and the early slavery-based southern economy, no doubt need to be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  27  Id. at 381 (citing Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, 
AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007)). 
  28  See id. 
  29  Id. at 390. 
  30  Id. at 381 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS (1965)). 
  31  See id. at 382–83. 
  32  Id. at 384; see id. at 384–86. 
  33  See id. at 386–89. 
  34  Id. at 389. 
  35  Id. at 390.    
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woven into the answers.”36  Tonry argues that “[r]esearch agendas in 
coming years should focus on this level of explanation.”37 
4.  Nicola Lacey. — In The Prisoners’ Dilemma,38 Professor Nicola 
Lacey adds a different dimension to the various historical and cultural 
accounts canvassed thus far.  Her account emphasizes the importance 
of differences in prevailing structures of political economy, as well as 
associated differences in political systems, in explaining punishment 
policy differences in contemporary democracies.  Lacey contrasts two 
polar modes of political economy in contemporary democratic states.  
On the one hand, the “co-ordinated market economy”39 (CME) de-
pends on “long-term relationships and stable structures of investment,” 
including investment in education and job training, and “incorporates 
a wide range of social groups and institutions into a highly co-
ordinated governmental structure.”40  On the other hand, the “liberal 
market economy”41 (LME) is “more individualistic in structure,” “less 
interventionist in regulatory stance,” and much less dependent “on the 
sorts of co-ordinating institutions which are needed to sustain long-
term economic and social relations.”42  Lacey argues that because 
CMEs benefit more from the reintegration of offenders into society 
and the economy, they are “structurally less likely to opt for degrada-
tion or exclusionary stigmatisation in punishment.”43  Conversely, 
LMEs are more likely to produce surplus unskilled labor, and thus 
“the costs of a harsh, exclusionary criminal justice system are less than 
they would be in a co-ordinated market economy.”44 
These two types of economies, Lacey notes, are associated empiri-
cally with different political systems as well.  CMEs are associated 
with systems of proportional representation, while LMEs tend to have 
first-past-the-post, winner-take-all electoral systems.45  Like Whitman 
and Tonry, Lacey sees criminal justice policymaking as more insulated 
from populist influences in systems of proportional representation than 
in winner-take-all systems.46  Lacey deepens this widely shared percep-
tion by showing how the pursuit of “floating, median voters”47 in win-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  36  Id. 
  37  Id. 
  38  LACEY, supra note 6. 
  39  Id. at 58 (quoting Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capital-
ism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 1, 8 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  40  Id. 
  41  Id. (quoting Hall & Soskice, supra note 39, at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  42  Id. at 59. 
  43  Id. at 58. 
  44  Id. at 59. 
  45  Id. at 64. 
  46  See id. at 64–66. 
  47  Id. at 69.    
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ner-take-all systems allows for single-issue campaigns when there is a 
single issue — like crime over the past several decades — that has 
wide appeal to such voters.48  Such single issues become even more 
powerful, Lacey observes, when a winner-take-all electoral system is 
paired with weak party discipline and decentralized political authority, 
as is the case in the United States.49 
Lacey also notes a second political difference that is associated em-
pirically with the two types of economies: the degree of deference ac-
corded to the expertise of the professional bureaucracy.50  In CMEs, 
the relevant bureaucrats in the criminal justice system — policy advis-
ers, prison officials, prosecutors, and judges — tend to be long-term, 
career civil servants whose social status is high, whose expertise is re-
spected, and who operate within a more insulated and less politically 
polarized environment.51  In contrast, the same officials in LMEs more 
often face either direct electoral accountability or strong pressure to 
defer to the political needs of the elected leaders whom they serve.52  
Like Whitman, Lacey connects the independence of mediating bureau-
cratic institutions with the likelihood of milder penal policies.  As La-
cey crisply observes, “[o]nce a professional bureaucracy is undermined, 
one of the main tools for depoliticising criminal justice is removed.”53 
5.  William Stuntz. — In The Collapse of American Criminal Jus-
tice,54 Professor William Stuntz privileges yet a different dimension of 
American distinctiveness to explain America’s turn toward penal 
harshness — the powerful backlash that countered the constitutional 
law and criminal justice policies of the 1960s.  This account places 
both law and the incentives of legal and political actors at center stage.  
According to Stuntz, the punitive turn that began in the 1970s was a 
response to the combination of excessively lenient punishment policies 
and rising crime rates during the 1960s, along with an attempt by in-
stitutional actors to counteract the new procedural rights that the War-
ren Court’s criminal procedure revolution granted to criminal defen-
dants.55  This backlash took the form of a “partisan bidding war”56 in 
the political arena for tough-on-crime policies.  In Stuntz’s view, how-
ever, further analysis is required to understand the precise dynamics 
by which this backlash — which might otherwise have been merely a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  48  See id. at 68–70. 
  49  See id. at 70. 
  50  See id. at 72. 
  51  See id. 
  52  See id. at 72–74. 
  53  Id. at 74. 
  54  WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). 
  55  See id. at 252–53. 
  56  Id. at 253.    
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natural corrective to the 1960s pendulum swing toward leniency — 
became a punitive “turn toward extremism and excess.”57 
Stuntz identifies four additional factors that pushed the backlash 
toward extremes.  He begins by noting that “the punitive turn was so 
punitive because it was so long-lasting — and it lasted so long in large 
part because the crime wave that prompted it lasted even longer.”58  
To the duration of the crime wave, Stuntz adds three further consider-
ations that all have to do with the incentives of official actors within 
the criminal justice system.  First, “the allocation of budget authority” 
(by which state and federal governments pay for prisons and local 
governments pay for police) creates political incentives for local offi-
cials to rely more heavily on locking people up than on preventive po-
licing in response to rising crime rates.59  Second, the triumph of plea 
bargaining as a legal institution made prosecutions cheaper per unit; it 
“increase[d] dramatically the ratio of convicted felons to prosecutors 
and defense lawyers.”60  Finally, the “substantive criminal law changed 
in ways that likewise encouraged more guilty pleas and fewer jury tri-
als”61 — because legislatures enhanced prosecutorial bargaining power 
in order to offset the costs of the new procedural rights that the War-
ren Court granted to defendants.62  Like Lacey, Stuntz offers an expla-
nation for America’s punitive penal policies that focuses less on history 
and culture and more on the incentives produced by institutional ar-
rangements.  Unlike Lacey, however, Stuntz concentrates primarily on 
legal rather than economic institutions, analyzing the effects of legal 
rules and allocations of legal power on the incentives of official actors. 
B.  Situating Garland Within the Exceptionalism Debate 
Garland’s focus in Peculiar Institution on the death penalty in par-
ticular, rather than on punishment policy more generally, leads him to 
address, quite profitably, some issues orthogonal to the main thrust of 
the penal exceptionalism debate.  Like Zimring, who also focuses on 
the death penalty, Garland is struck by the conflict and ambivalence 
that surround capital punishment in the United States, despite its con-
tinued use.  This conflict is reflected by the rarity of executions in the 
thirty-four states that retain the death penalty, where the most com-
mon cause of death on death row is “natural causes” (p. 11).  Moreover, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  57  Id. 
  58  Id. 
  59  Id. 
  60  Id. 
  61  Id. 
  62  See generally William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. 
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even when convicted murderers are executed, it is only “after a very 
long process of legal contestation and uncertainty” (p. 11).  “The over-
all picture,” Garland observes, “looks less like the simple ‘retention’ of 
capital punishment and more like an extreme form of institutional am-
bivalence, expressed in a uniquely cumbersome and conflicted set of 
arrangements” (p. 11).  These arrangements render it exceedingly un-
likely that the death penalty, imposed so rarely and after such long de-
lays, could measurably contribute to its stated goals of retribution and 
deterrence.  Thus, Garland questions whether capital punishment 
could plausibly serve additional functions beyond “the classic criminal 
justice purposes” in contemporary American society (p. 286). 
It is in answering this question, in a chapter titled Death and Its 
Uses (pp. 285–307), that Garland offers some of his most psychological-
ly insightful and eloquent observations.  He explains how the current 
practice of capital punishment in America “meets needs, provides ben-
efits, and generates value for specific groups and actors” (p. 287).  One 
such group is criminal justice professionals: for police officers, prison 
guards, prosecutors, and even defense attorneys, “capital punishment is 
a practical instrument that allows them to harness the power of death 
in the pursuit of professional objectives” (p. 288).  Of course, Garland 
recognizes that “[t]he most prominent ‘users’ of capital punishment in 
recent decades have been actors on the political stage” (p. 291).  
Elected officials of all stripes not only have relied on the powerful po-
litical shorthand of the death penalty but also have used the death pen-
alty as “a token of political exchange” by which capital penalties allo-
cate “enhanced status to selected constituents” and operate as “a 
political commodity  .  .  .  in the process of political bargaining” (pp. 
291–93).  Outside the political realm, the mass media, too, use the 
death penalty, relying on “the entertainment value of a death threat” to 
spice up reporting even of cases with only the most distant likelihood 
of capital charges (p. 294).  Noting that “[t]he mass media deal in feel-
ing, in sensation, in heightened emotion,” Garland observes that “trials 
where defendants face the prospect of death are perfect for media pur-
poses” (p. 295).  Garland is at his most poetic when he delves into the 
reasons that consumers of the media — all of us — are so compelled 
by the prospect of the death penalty, noting that it is precisely because 
the “death penalty proceeds amid normative anxiety and in violation 
of cultural taboos” that “it remains full of narrative potential” (p. 295).  
The pleasure of transgressing the taboos surrounding violence and 
death offers “a kind of liberation, a release from repression” (p. 304), 
and a “lascivious enjoyment” that create “a whole pornography of pain 
and death” (p. 300).  Garland’s subtle compendium of “the promise, the 
power, and the pleasure of death” (p. 312) convincingly and evocative-
ly describes the often subterranean functions of capital punishment in 
contemporary American society.    
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On the question more central to the penal exceptionalism debate — 
how the United States came to retain the death penalty in the first 
place — Garland is also a source of new insights and emphases.  Gar-
land builds on Whitman’s secondary thesis about the “power and au-
tonomy” of European states in comparison to the United States to 
show how the relative weakness of the American state has led to the 
devolution of authority over capital punishment to local political 
communities.  American constitutional federalism, as emphasized by 
Tonry, is a substantial part of the story, but Garland contends that 
“[t]he relative weakness of the American nation state was economic 
and logistical as well as political” (p. 155).  America’s original “peculiar 
institution” of slavery limited the federal government’s powers to tax 
and to monopolize the legitimate use of force, because slave states’ re-
sistance to federal power led to less regulated markets and less centra-
lized law enforcement.  Garland’s “weak state” thesis thus may explain 
and buttress Lacey’s emphasis on the features associated with liberal 
market economies.  Moreover, at several points in American history, 
waves of political reform created constraints on state power such as 
“referenda, voter ballot initiatives, term limits, and open primaries in 
order to strengthen the power of the popular vote and to further limit 
the power of government incumbents” (p. 157).  Like both Whitman 
and Lacey, Garland notes the weakness of mediating institutions like 
political parties and powerful bureaucratic elites in the United States.  
This weakness further contributes to the power of populist forces in 
policymaking, resulting in what Garland terms a “hyperdemocracy” (p. 
164). 
In Garland’s account, this vacuum of state power at the center 
helped to create and continues to reinforce a powerful localism and 
populism in the United States.  These institutional and political fea-
tures also undergird and interact with other features of American “so-
ciety and culture” (p. 166) that Garland argues are centrally implicated 
in America’s death penalty story.  The cultural features emphasized by 
Garland echo many of Tonry’s themes: the lack of social solidarity and 
conflict among social groups, particularly along the lines of race; high 
levels of interpersonal violence, especially in the South; and distinc-
tively American “cultural commitments” (p. 166), including not only 
populism and localism but also antistatism, individualism, religiosity, 
and the conflicting pulls of “ruggedness and refinement” (p. 175). 
Against this institutional and cultural backdrop, Garland engaging-
ly tells the story of the Supreme Court’s temporary abolition of capital 
punishment in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia63 and the powerful backlash 
that it engendered, particularly in the South (pp. 206–55).  When the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  63  408 U.S. 238 (1972).    
2012]  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND CONTINGENCY  773 
Court changed course and upheld a new generation of capital statutes 
four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,64 the institution of capital punish-
ment was “reinvented” in the United States, with the Court playing a 
“civilizing” role in limiting the scope of the death penalty (to a narrow 
set of offenses and to offenders with unimpaired culpability), while al-
so “democratizing” the practice by returning the issue to local political 
actors and decisionmakers (pp. 268–80).  Garland recounts how, in this 
post-reinstatement era, the death penalty “became a kind of masthead 
symbol for a new culture of control with its harsh sentencing laws, its 
mass imprisonment, and its risk-averse retributivism,” functioning as a 
“litmus test for law and order commitment” (p. 244).  Here, Garland’s 
account dovetails with Stuntz’s description of a criminal justice back-
lash to the 1960s that led to a partisan bidding war for tough-on-crime 
policies.  Naturally, the death penalty then took on quite different char-
acteristics regionally within the United States, with the vast majority 
of executions taking place in southern and southwestern states, where 
the death penalty’s salience as an issue of “states’ rights” and its sym-
bolic place in America’s “culture wars” fueled its popularity (pp. 248–
49).  Like Zimring, Garland also emphasizes “the underlying continui-
ties and connections” between the South’s history of lynchings and the 
administration of contemporary capital punishment, including the geo-
graphical and racial patterns of its imposition, the community passions 
aroused by executions, and the death penalty’s continuing function as 
a means by which “groups of people express their autonomy, invoke 
their traditional values, and assert their local identity” (pp. 34–35). 
Garland’s account of America’s recent death penalty history and 
current capital punishment practices is thoughtful and well observed; 
it evokes the same sort of flash of recognition that one experiences 
viewing the work of a skilled portraitist who “captures” a subject on 
canvas.  One of the most substantial contributions of Garland’s ac-
count is its emphasis on the contingency of the American death penal-
ty story, on its unpredictable (rather than foreordained) unfolding as a 
complex interaction of institutional structures, cultural dispositions, 
and contingent historical events.  Garland readily acknowledges that 
the story could have unfolded quite differently — that the United 
States might well have decisively (rather than temporarily) rejected 
capital punishment through constitutional litigation at the time of 
Furman (p. 207) and that the current retention of the death penalty 
might yet prove to be transient (p. 23).  In Garland’s account, institu-
tional and legal structures take center stage over some unitary notion 
of deep, deterministic “culture.”  For Garland, culture is the ever-
changing flow of meaning that is channeled through these structures 
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rather than an unchanging social fact that can serve as a satisfactory 
explanation for the complex course of history.  In an earlier review of 
Whitman’s and Zimring’s theses, Garland elaborated on the kind of 
cultural argument that he rejects, explaining that culture is not 
a fixed predisposition, like a DNA strand present in each social cell, pro-
gramming social behaviour whenever it is switched on. . . . Without institu-
tionalized grounding, cultural meanings are ephemeral currents — associa-
tions, connotations and linked images that can be rapidly replaced by 
others. . . . Cultural determinism is no more convincing than determinisms of 
any other kind: in denying the role of agency and of contingency it ends up 
denying the very history that it tries to explain.65 
Any resistance that I feel to Garland’s extremely persuasive account 
of capital punishment in America is to the extent that his account un-
dermines or undersells its own contingency thesis.  First, Garland at 
least muddies and perhaps even undermines his argument for contin-
gency by trying to incorporate into his account all of the “cultural 
commitments” (p. 166) that he sees as implicated in the American 
death penalty story, such as populism, antielitism, violence, and reli-
giosity (pp. 166–82).  Despite the nuance and insight of Garland’s cul-
tural observations, one cannot help feeling that he wants to have his 
cake and eat it, too — to reject a certain kind of cultural argument but 
also to embrace the role of culture in his own account.  Garland’s de-
sire to include his own take on American culture leads him to distance 
himself from other cultural accounts in a way that is not entirely fair, 
setting them up as species of straw men.  In Peculiar Institution, Gar-
land does not identify the scholars whose work he challenges, referring 
instead to unnamed “commentators” (p. 20) or “conventional commen-
taries” (p. 309) that reify culture as a single, overarching force.  We 
know from Garland’s earlier review of Whitman’s and Zimring’s 
works that they are among those he criticizes for treating cultural dis-
positions as unchanging and deterministic premises.  However, Whit-
man and Zimring have responded, reasonably enough, that they view 
neither culture as unchanging66 nor historical outcomes as predeter-
mined by cultural forces.67  It would be fairer to criticize Whitman and 
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Zimring (and Tonry, for that matter) for locating the primary explana-
tions for America’s divergence in criminal and capital punishment so 
far in the past, when the timing of the divergence is so much more re-
cent.  This disagreement about the relevant time frame represents an 
indisputable difference in emphasis between Garland’s account and 
those of Whitman, Zimring, and Tonry. 
But Garland undermines his emphasis on recent, contingent events 
by simultaneously developing his own account of American culture 
that is sometimes difficult to distinguish from those of Whitman, Zim-
ring, and Tonry.  Like Whitman, Garland emphasizes the weakness of 
the American state and populist distrust of political elites; like Zim-
ring, Garland emphasizes America’s legacy of slavery and racial vi-
olence, especially lynching; like Tonry, Garland emphasizes the role of 
American religiosity.  Consequently, something akin to Garland’s criti-
que of essentialist cultural arguments could be leveled at his own re-
liance, despite his many caveats, on “the distinctive nature of [Ameri-
can] society and culture” in the unfolding of the death penalty story (p. 
166).  The more one weaves distinctive cultural dispositions into a sto-
ry of distinctive institutions, the harder it is to disassociate oneself 
completely from cultural essentialism or to maintain a strong insistence 
on contingency.  The more one understands, in a deep way, all of the 
contributions, including cultural ones, to the present, the harder it is to 
imagine that things could have happened any differently.  Sociological 
history thus always struggles — and Garland’s account is no excep-
tion — to find some middle ground between tautology (any present 
practice reflects other aspects of the present and the past) and deter-
minism (the present is the single possible outcome of the past).  Of 
course, it is not methodologically incoherent to insist both that histori-
cal events are contingent and that they are bounded or shaped by so-
cial forces.  Garland tries to express this dualism many times, perhaps 
most clearly when he writes of the American death penalty’s recent 
history: “[C]ontingency counts, context counts, history counts.  No one 
fully controlled what happened . . . .  Instead, the underlying conflicts 
and fault lines of American society structured patterns of action and 
helped shape the eventual outcomes” (pp. 254–55).  But there is always 
some tension in embracing both “contingency” and “structure,” and one 
wishes that Garland had done more to address this tension head-on.  
His argument would have been stronger had he elaborated on how his 
reconciliation between contingency and structure differs from those of 
Whitman, Zimring, Tonry, and others, rather than from the anony-
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mous, unidimensional, and almost caricatured version of cultural es-
sentialism that he invokes as a foil. 
Garland’s story of contingency is further undermined by his at-
tempt to extend his theory of America’s divergence from Europe to his 
account of divergences in death penalty practices among American 
states.  Here, Garland’s attraction to the broad sweep of sociological 
theory obscures a less tidy but probably truer story of even more radi-
cal contingency.  Applying his “weak state” theory to individual Amer-
ican states, Garland posits that “low levels of state development” char-
acterize retentionist states vis-à-vis abolitionist states (p. 196) and that 
cultural dispositions (such as “cultures of civility and humanism” and 
“communal solidarity”) are likewise different in retentionist and aboli-
tionist states (pp. 198–99).  These conclusions are not necessarily false 
(although measurement of such cultural dispositions is a tricky busi-
ness at best), but they obscure the extent to which states themselves 
may be the wrong level at which to consider the nature and persistence 
of capital punishment practices in the United States.  There is extraor-
dinary divergence of death penalty practices among localities within 
retentionist states, even among localities that look very similar.68  It is 
possible that explanations for these divergences may ultimately map 
onto Garland’s theories,69 but it seems at least as likely that other fac-
tors are at play, including the idiosyncrasies of local district attor-
neys.70  The radical localism that is the result of American institutional 
structures also means that no big, top-down theory is going to map 
perfectly onto the micro level. 
Finally, Garland’s contingency thesis is shakiest when he seeks to 
distinguish between the contingency of the “fact” of America’s reten-
tion of the death penalty (which Garland freely acknowledges could 
have gone the other way at the time of Furman) and the “form” of 
America’s retention in the decades since Furman, which Garland 
maintains “has a pattern that is far from accidental” and which reflects 
the distinctive facets of American institutional arrangements and cul-
tural commitments that Garland observes so well (p. 152).  Although 
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Garland is right that the contemporary form of the death penalty re-
flects the features of American society that he identifies, it is surely al-
so true that those features of American society could have yielded 
quite different “forms” of death penalty practices had events played 
out only slightly differently.  In particular, the nature and timing of the 
Supreme Court’s intervention in the country’s capital punishment 
drama played a crucial role in the contemporary form of the death pen-
alty, a fact that is underappreciated in Garland’s account.  Moreover, 
the Court’s intervention diverted the United States from the path of 
human rights discourse embraced in Europe — one that Garland sur-
prisingly neglects as a foil to the American experience.  Like Stuntz, 
who emphasizes the role of legal change and the Supreme Court in the 
1960s as central to the story of punishment practices, I want to put the 
role of the Supreme Court and constitutional law more centrally in the 
picture, especially in the account of contingency.  The best way to do 
this is to imagine, counterfactually but not implausibly, three roads not 
taken. 
II.  SLIDING DOORS: THREE ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORIES OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 
The idea of contingency is one with great narrative power, which is 
why it often recurs in both fiction and film.  Consider the success of 
novels like Michael Chabon’s The Yiddish Policemen’s Union,71 which 
imagines a Jewish settlement in Alaska rather than a Jewish state in 
Palestine, or Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America,72 which imagines 
what would have happened in the United States during World War II 
if Charles Lindbergh, who sympathized with the Nazi regime, had de-
feated FDR in the 1940 presidential election.  In conjuring phantom 
histories, these novels make us see vividly how recognizable features of 
our institutions and culture could produce very different, even unrec-
ognizable, outcomes.  In this same vein, the film Sliding Doors73 im-
agines two entirely different story lines whose divergence turns on 
whether or not a young woman manages to board a particular London 
underground train, emphasizing the potentially outsized consequences 
of chance events and timing.  I want to adopt this conceit and play out 
three different contemporary American death penalty stories that vary 
from the “true” version and from each other based on the timing and 
nature of the Supreme Court’s intervention. 
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A.  Warren Court Abolition 
As Garland and Zimring both agree, it is entirely plausible that the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional abolition of capital punishment could 
have been definitive rather than temporary, taking capital punishment 
permanently off the American agenda.  By imagining how a definitive 
constitutional abolition might have happened and what its consequences 
would have been, we can see more clearly the contingency of both the 
fact and the nature of current American death penalty exceptionalism. 
The Supreme Court first signaled its interest in the issue of capital 
punishment in 1963 in a dissent from denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. 
Alabama,74 written by Justice Goldberg and joined by Justices Douglas 
and Brennan — just one vote short of the four needed to grant review.  
The dissenters urged the Court to consider the argument that the 
death penalty was constitutionally disproportionate to the crime of 
rape75 — an argument that the Court would later accept.76  I n  t h e  
1960s the use of capital punishment was falling in the United States, as 
it was in most other Western democracies.  Public support for the 
death penalty was falling as well; indeed, a 1966 Gallup poll showed 
for the first time that a greater number of respondents opposed the 
death penalty than supported it (forty-seven percent to forty-two per-
cent).77  I n  1965, the British Parliament passed an act provisionally 
abolishing the death penalty for murder, which became permanent in 
1969.78  During this same decade, the U.S. Supreme Court was in the 
midst of a “revolution” in constitutional criminal procedure, in which 
the Court extended the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule,79 the 
right to counsel in criminal cases,80 and the right to trial by jury in 
criminal cases,81 among other key rulings.  If the Court had addressed 
the ultimate constitutionality of capital punishment in the mid-1960s, 
rather than deferring action until after President Nixon had appointed 
four new Justices to the Court, it is entirely conceivable that the Court 
could and would have acted definitively. 
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Imagine that the Court took up the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment sometime between 1963 and 1968, when Earl Warren was still 
Chief Justice and before Nixon was elected President — instead or 
ahead of its infamous 1966 Miranda decision limiting police interroga-
tion practices.82  Suppose further that the case challenging the death 
penalty’s constitutionality came from one of the big death penalty 
states outside the South (such as New York, Pennsylvania, or Califor-
nia).  And suppose that the issue was litigated not by the united forces 
of the civil rights community through the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, as Furman was, but by a more mainstream legal team less likely 
to inspire backlash in the South — a team led by someone like Albert 
E. Jenner, Jr., the nationally known lawyer who had served on the 
Warren Commission and who litigated the first key constitutional vic-
tory for death penalty opponents in Witherspoon v. Illinois83 in 1968.  
Under these circumstances, the chances of a ruling against the death 
penalty would have been high — especially after Justice Marshall re-
placed Justice Clark on the Court in 1967.  Although Chief Justice 
Warren was not eager to decide the constitutional issue in the mid-
1960s (as demonstrated by his refraining from voting to grant review 
in Rudolph), he made his opposition to capital punishment clear, an-
nouncing upon his retirement that he found the death penalty “repul-
sive.”84  And Justice Fortas, who replaced Justice Goldberg in 1965, 
clearly shared Justice Goldberg’s abhorrence for the death penalty, 
penning a widely circulated argument against the practice less than a 
decade after he, along with Chief Justice Warren, left the Court in 
1969.85  Thus, a 1960s majority composed of Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Marshall might well have 
voted against the death penalty on broad and decisive grounds,86 and 
it is possible that Justice Stewart or Justice White, both of whom even-
tually voted with the Furman majority in 1972 to hold the death pen-
alty unconstitutional, could have been persuaded to do so or to concur 
on narrower grounds at this earlier time.87 
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An opinion more decisively rejecting the constitutionality of capital 
punishment is not difficult to imagine — or even to craft from the 
meandering threads of the five individual opinions of the Furman ma-
jority.  The argument that won over Justices Stewart and White in 
Furman was the claim that capital punishment as then widely prac-
ticed in the United States — yielding only a few executions from the 
broad category of death-eligible offenders based on the unreviewable 
discretion of sentencing juries — could not measurably contribute to 
any legitimate goals of punishment.88  The only solutions to this prob-
lem would be to drastically limit sentencing discretion or to ramp up 
the use of capital punishment.  Instead of taking the post-Furman ap-
proach of requiring that capital sentencing discretion be guided, the 
Court could have concluded that such guidance was not possible (as 
Justice Harlan had argued in McGautha v. California89) and that an 
intolerable degree of arbitrariness and discrimination was unavoidable 
(as Justice Douglas argued in Furman90).  The inevitably arbitrary im-
position of such a severe penalty could be said to violate human digni-
ty and thus be inconsistent with “the evolving standards of decency”91 
that guided the Court’s understanding of the Eighth Amendment (con-
sistent with the thrust of Justices Brennan and Marshall’s conclusions 
in Furman).  The point is that the concerns that led to the Court’s con-
stitutional regulation of capital punishment could have yielded a deci-
sive constitutional abolition. 
Had such an opinion been issued in the mid-1960s, it undoubtedly 
would have produced a backlash, especially as the crime rate rose, just 
as  Miranda did.  But that backlash might not have been quite as 
strong as the one that greeted Furman, given the earlier timing.   
Moreover, the backlash might have been somewhat less extreme in the 
South if the cases at issue were not southern ones and the petitioners 
were not represented by the same civil rights organization that had 
previously litigated the desegregation cases.  Furthermore, the rest of 
the country might have discounted or even derided any southern back-
lash against constitutional abolition that occurred in the mid-1960s be-
cause of its closer temporal link to the South’s ugly and violent resis-
tance to the civil rights movement.  More importantly, a decisive 
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constitutional abolition that firmly concluded that the death penalty 
could not be made to comport with contemporary values would have 
rendered later attempts to reinstate capital punishment extremely dif-
ficult to mount.  The much less clear and decisive Furman decision 
contained an obvious invitation to future legislation and therefore liti-
gation — an invitation thirty-five states accepted in the four years be-
tween Furman and Gregg by drafting new death penalty statutes (p. 
192).  A more decisive, per se ruling would have contained no such in-
vitation; rather, any state that passed a new capital statute would have 
had to run the gauntlet of state and lower federal courts sworn to ap-
ply the Supreme Court’s rulings faithfully.  Unlike the organized cam-
paign of opposition that followed Roe v. Wade92 (and continues to this 
day), a campaign to reinstate the death penalty would not have had 
recourse to any incremental means to chip away at abolition (such as 
limiting public funding or enacting waiting periods or parental notifi-
cation requirements in the abortion context).  It is thus entirely plausi-
ble that a decisive constitutional abolition could have “stuck.” 
If the Warren Court had produced an enduring constitutional ab-
olition of capital punishment in the 1960s, the United States would 
have been at the forefront of the wave of abolition that swept Europe 
from the 1970s to the 1990s, and the United States would have re-
ceived (or at least assigned itself) credit for being a leader in this hu-
man rights revolution, a position that would have made backsliding 
more unattractive, just as it has in Europe.93  This counterfactual sce-
nario highlights the way the Supreme Court’s actual acceptance of the 
American death penalty as consistent with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution has precluded American acceptance of 
a human rights frame for the issue of capital punishment.  It is striking 
that even in successful abolitionist movements within the United 
States — like those that led to the recent legislative abolitions in New 
Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois — arguments to the effect that capital 
punishment violates a fundamental human right (to life or dignity) are 
virtually absent.94  This resistance in the United States to seeing capi-
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  92  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
  93  See generally  WILLIAM  A.  SCHABAS,  THE  ABOLITION  OF  THE  DEATH  PENALTY  IN 
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  94  See, e.g., Symposium, Legislation, Litigation, Reflection and Repeal: The Legislative Aboli-
tion of the Death Penalty in New Jersey, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (2008) (describing the ab-
olitionist efforts leading to legislative repeal of the death penalty in New Jersey); Deborah Baker, 
NM Governor Signs Death Penalty Repeal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 2009, available at Fac-
tiva, Doc. No. APRS000020090319e53j0001d (reporting the Governor’s statement that his con-
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peal bill into law in New Mexico); Leigh B. Bienen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the 
Aftermath of the Ryan Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Is-
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tal punishment as a human rights issue stems in part from the power-
ful and preemptive role that constitutional law plays in American 
rights discourse.  Many have noted, often ruefully, the widespread ten-
dency in American society and legal culture to venerate the Constitu-
tion in a way that assumes that everything that is good — and certain-
ly any right that is fundamental to human flourishing — is contained 
within it.95  Whereas Garland emphasizes the role of the Supreme 
Court in generating backlash regarding capital punishment, it is also 
worth excavating the legitimizing role of the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional imprimatur on capital punishment.96 
An enduring constitutional abolition obviously would have ren-
dered moot any question of American exceptionalism with regard to 
the death penalty.  But playing out the counterfactual not only illus-
trates the plausibility of this alternative scenario but also demonstrates 
that the mode of divergence that did occur was the product of the par-
ticular nature and timing of the Supreme Court’s intervention. 
B.  Constitutional Avoidance 
The significance of the Supreme Court’s intervention in the path of 
capital punishment in the United States becomes even more apparent 
if we imagine its complete (or near-complete) absence.  At least as 
plausible as an enduring constitutional abolition is the possibility that 
the Supreme Court might simply have left the question in the hands of 
the political branches.  The Court offered a powerful rationale for 
doing so when it rejected a due process challenge to capital punish-
ment in 1971 in McGautha, maintaining that the discretionary Ameri-
can death penalty could not be improved by quixotic attempts to ra-
tionalize it.97  Justices Stewart and White were both members of the 
McGautha majority, and if one or both of them had failed to be 
swayed by a similar attack on unguided discretion under the Eighth 
Amendment the following year, the Furman challenge would have 
been defeated.  If so, the strong conviction of the Court’s Nixon ap-
pointees that the question of capital punishment belonged to the states 
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sues of Cost, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301 (2010) (describing the importance of cost 
considerations to abolition efforts in Illinois). 
  95  See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (describing quasi-
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  96  See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Dec-
ades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429–38 (1995) 
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  97  See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (asserting the impossibility of drafting 
capital statutes that could offer guidance to sentencing juries that would improve on their discre-
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(and to Congress in the federal system) would have been resoundingly 
vindicated.  Perhaps the Court might have gone on to police the bor-
ders of capital punishment, eventually rejecting it for crimes less than 
murder or offenders with reduced culpability, such as juveniles.  But if 
the Court not only had refused to temporarily abolish the death penal-
ty but also had failed to develop the complex body of Eighth Amend-
ment regulatory law that followed its constitutional reinstatement of 
the death penalty, the consequences for the path of capital punishment 
in America would have been profound.  
First, the absence of Supreme Court intervention would have pre-
vented the backlash, strongest in the South, that Furman unleashed 
and that Garland so engagingly recounts.  Thus, it is highly unlikely 
that the death penalty would have become an issue of states’ rights 
and at least somewhat less likely that it would have become the kind 
of masthead symbol for law-and-order politics or shibboleth in the cul-
ture wars that it became when it was so strongly linked with the liber-
al wing of the Supreme Court — the same Court that had imposed 
Brown, Miranda, and Roe.  Quite apart from Furman’s symbolic signi-
ficance, its absence would have practical consequences, because it 
would also entail the absence of the regulatory regime that grew up in 
the wake of Gregg’s reinstatement of the death penalty.  In the absence 
of the development of an ongoing body of constitutional law supervis-
ing death penalty procedures, there would be far fewer opportunities 
for federal courts to intervene in the administration of the death penal-
ty in southern states (or anywhere else).  Controversies like whether 
the federal courts were obstructing too many California executions or 
not staying enough Texas executions would be nonexistent.  There 
would also be less impetus for “reform” legislation proposing to 
streamline federal review, like the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996,98 which was passed in the wake of the Oklahoma 
City bombing attack.  Consequently, in the most active and committed 
death penalty states, the death penalty would be less of an issue than it 
is today — less threatened by the meddling of distant elites like the 
federal courts and more unequivocally endorsed by the constitutional 
order as an issue properly in local hands. 
Conversely, in a world without Furman or Gregg, conflict over the 
death penalty would be far more concentrated outside the South, in 
states where abolitionist activists, politicians, and judges were more 
prevalent.  State supreme courts in such jurisdictions would undoubt-
edly need to rule on state constitutional challenges to capital punish-
ment even more frequently than they did in the Furman and post-
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  98  Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
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Furman eras (as in California, Massachusetts, and New York, for ex-
ample).99  Hence, whatever backlash came into play would be back-
lash against state actors, as with the constitutional amendment that 
followed the California Supreme Court’s abolition of the death penalty 
just months before Furman.100  Consequently, it is not obvious that the 
use of the death penalty in such a world would be as concentrated as it 
is today in the South.  Prior to Furman, as Garland notes (p. 200), Cal-
ifornia, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were all substantial ex-
ecuting states, and without the Supreme Court to demand substantive 
and procedural restrictions that states like these might accept while the 
South resisted, it is not clear that the concentration of executions 
would have happened the way it did in the wake of Furman and 
Gregg.  Accordingly, the map of controversy regarding the death penal-
ty — death penalty “hot spots,” if you will — would likely resemble 
the map of the current controversy over gay marriage, which has had 
focal points in states like Hawaii, Massachusetts, Iowa, and New 
York.  No one expects much development of the same-sex marriage 
debate in Alabama or Oklahoma.  Finally, in a world without constitu-
tional regulation of capital punishment, death penalty practices would 
undoubtedly be harsher — more nasty, brutish, and short — because 
they would be less cabined by the substantive and procedural restric-
tions of twenty-five years of Eighth Amendment constraint.  These 
qualities would likely have given a boost to abolitionist activities in 
“teetering states” and might have led a few more states to jump to the 
abolitionist camp than would have done so in a world with a kinder, 
gentler death penalty. 
In short, the pattern or “form” of capital punishment in the world 
of a more hands-off Supreme Court would look very different — an 
entirely plausible world that was only a single vote away in 1972. 
C.  Race-Based Abolition 
Yet another world also lay a single vote away — a later constitu-
tional abolition, rather than the earlier one imagined above.  The Su-
preme Court’s ruling in the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp,101 which 
rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty based 
on its racially discriminatory pattern of imposition, was a 5–4 decision.  
Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in McCleskey, repu-
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  99  In California, see People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).  In Massachusetts, see Com-
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  100  See MELTSNER, supra note 86, at 306–07. 
  101  481 U.S. 279 (1987).    
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diated his vote only a few years later, when his biographer asked him 
upon his retirement if there were any votes that he would change, and 
he replied, “Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.”102  Had Justice Powell actually 
voted the other way, then the death penalty would have been constitu-
tionally abolished in 1987 in a manner that would turn all of the race-
based theorizing about America’s current capital punishment excep-
tionalism on its head. 
An abolitionist opinion in McCleskey is not difficult to imagine 
(Justice Brennan’s dissent is the obvious place to start).  The majority 
frankly noted its concern that “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie 
our entire criminal justice system”103 and thus might apply both to 
noncapital cases and to discrimination beyond that based on race — a 
concern that Justice Brennan called “a fear of too much justice.”104  
But it would have been easy enough for the Court to draw a sharp line 
at capital punishment — something it had been doing in its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence since Furman, solemnly intoning in a varie-
ty of contexts that “death is different.”105  Moreover, it would have 
been just as possible to draw a sharp line around race as well, given 
the unique place of race in American history in general and in the his-
tory of capital punishment in particular — a history that Justice Bren-
nan surveyed at length in his dissent.106  Had the Court done so and 
held in favor of McCleskey based on his statistical case for the influ-
ence of race in Georgia’s capital sentencing process, the death of the 
death penalty would have inexorably followed.  It would have been 
next to impossible for states to rebut statistical proof of racial dispari-
ties, which have been found not only in the South but in many other 
jurisdictions as well.107  Furthermore, once the death penalty was con-
stitutionally suspended on racial grounds in a particular jurisdiction, it 
would be extraordinarily difficult and expensive, not to mention racial-
ly fraught, for such a jurisdiction to try to line up a cohort on death 
row large enough and representative enough to mount a reinstatement 
challenge. 
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Had racial disparities served as the impetus for American abolition 
of the death penalty in 1987, the “story” of the American death penalty 
would have been a radical inversion of the race-based theories that 
now proliferate to explain both the “fact” and the “form” of America’s 
retention of capital punishment.  From Zimring to Tonry to Garland, 
the importance of race and of the South’s history of lynching are cen-
tral to understanding how the United States came to be where it is to-
day with regard to the death penalty.  Yet this very same history could 
have served as the impetus not for the retention of capital punishment, 
nor for the distinctive pattern of its use in the old lynching states, but 
rather for a top-down, elite abolition of capital punishment as inconsis-
tent with the fundamental American value of equality enshrined in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.  That shameful history of 
racial violence would even get pride of place in the Court’s opinion (as it 
did in Justice Brennan’s dissent) — written into the very text of abolition. 
CONCLUSION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND CONTINGENCY 
Each of the counterfactual histories in Part II demonstrates, con-
trary to the implication of Garland’s account, that the cultural com-
mitments that Garland identifies as shaping the current form of Amer-
ican death penalty practices have no necessary valence; they might as 
easily have shaped an opposite outcome.  In section II.A (Warren 
Court abolition), American constitutionalism could have fed into the 
emergence of a human rights norm against executions rather than set 
its face against such a norm.  In section II.B (constitutional avoidance), 
American localism could have enabled the country to have a death  
penalty markedly less regulated and differently distributed geographi-
cally.  In section II.C (race-based abolition), the racial history of the 
American death penalty could have been the force driving its abolition 
rather than its retention.  Moreover, all three counterfactuals suggest 
that the Supreme Court and its contingent decisions play an important 
role in shaping cultural commitments, again in contrast to Garland’s 
account, which offers parallel and distinct (rather than intertwined) 
accounts of legal decisionmaking and cultural commitments. 
The “sliding doors” exercise thus both illustrates and underscores 
Garland’s contingency thesis and shows how it extends perhaps even 
further than Garland himself might take it — deeply into the “form” as 
well as the “fact” of American retention.  Chance events in Supreme 
Court litigation — the precise timing of a grant of review, the shift of a 
single vote — could have radically altered not only America’s course of 
abolition or retention but also, quite profoundly, the shape of death 
penalty practices whose current form Garland traces so convincingly 
to their institutional and cultural roots.  Garland’s conclusion that 
“[t]he death penalty’s new [post-Furman] meanings were grounded in 
the raw materials of preexisting conflicts and shaped by the structur-   
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ing presence of an institutional landscape” (p. 255) is powerful and 
persuasive, but we still need to be reminded — by chefs and garden-
ers, perhaps? — just how differently the same “raw materials” and 
“landscapes” can be rendered.  Only by unsettling the past can we 
keep in mind how unsettled the future is.  Sociological history at its 
best — and Garland’s is an excellent example — can be regarded only 
as a mirror, not as a crystal ball. 